NOTE: Time has picked up on this debate (HT: Justin Taylor)

David Instone-Brewer took the time to respond to my previous post on divorce and remarriage. In the response he clarifies some misunderstandings connected with his CT article. His response is below:

Dear Andreas

Thank you for interacting with my work at such length and with such evident understanding of my arguments.

I share your main problem with my CT article, which is that some people who are not familiar with my work might conclude that I’m advocating divorce for minor reasons. My actual conclusions are closer to yours – that neglect has to be persistent and serious, ie more-or-less equivalent to abandonment (a concept which you rightly picked up from my books).

When I wrote the Christianity Today article, I struggled greatly with the word limit for such an important subject. There wasn’t room to define neglect, so I referred readers to my Divorce & Remarriage in the Church (the full text is at www.DivorceRemarriage.com)

The book points out that ‘neglect’ is an inadequate modern-day way of summarising the stipulations of ‘food, clothing and love’ in Ex.21.10f (as repeated in marriage contracts in Jesus’ day). It also details the way in which Jesus emphasises that a wronged partner should forgive and forgive and forgive and that turning to divorce as a remedy for persistant neglect is a last resort.

I’m sorry that I have caused confusion by not making this clear in the article itself. See my response to this and other issues here.

David Instone-Brewer

Thank you very much for your comments on my previous post on the CT article by David Instone-Brewer and the response by John Piper. In light of the many excellent questions and comments, I decided to follow up with another post responding to comments made both on Justin Taylor’s blog and on this one. I certainly don’t expect to convert everyone to my view, but hopefully my comments will clarify some of the things I left unaddressed in my previous post. Again, please remember that much of this is addressed more fully in Chapter 11 of God, Marriage & Family. Also, my first post here at Biblical Foundations addressed the topic of divorce and remarriage. Since I don’t know all your full names, my responses below are to the various questions you raised. You know who you are, and will have no problem finding where I addressed your particular question. Please understand that I will not be able to continue this dialogue indefinitely, though your questions and comments are always welcome, and will be incorporated in the second edition of God, Marriage & Family if and when it is published.

Before addressing your questions, let me draw your attention to two extensive notes in God, Marriage & Family that address Instone-Brewer’s inclusion of neglect as legitimate grounds for divorce. On p. 412, n. 76, I wrote, “To this some have added other extreme circumstances (such as persistent spousal abuse) when confronted through the process laid out in Matthew 18:15–17, though great caution would need to be exercised in this regard in order not to undermine the high scriptural view of marriage. … Others, such as Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, passim, postulate the permissibility of divorce more broadly for material and emotional neglect. Instone-Brewer maintains that Jesus’ silence on this point in Matthew 19 should be construed as tacit agreement with universal Jewish practice in this regard on the basis of Exodus 21:10–11 … and contends that Paul alludes to the same passage in 1 Corinthians 8:3.”

At this point I refer to an earlier critique of Instone-Brewer’s view in God, Marriage & Family, which is found on p. 355, n. 25, where I wrote, “Cf. Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 99–110, who also documents the influence of this passage on Jewish divorce laws, which stipulated the permissibility of divorce for both material … and emotional neglect. … Instone-Brewer proceeds to argue that Jesus’ silence on divorce on the basis of Exodus 21:10–11 should be construed as his agreement with the Jewish consensus view at this point … and that Paul’s allusion to this passage in 1 Corinthians 7 should be taken to imply that Paul, too, allowed for divorce because of marital neglect. … We find Instone-Brewer’s arguments from silence precarious, however. In Jesus’ case, one would have expected him to add marital neglect to porneia as a second exception for divorce if he had approved of neglect as a legitimate ground for divorce. In Paul’s case, it is one thing to say that he alluded to Exodus 21:10–11 but quite another to say that this implies that he approved of divorce for marital neglect. Especially in light of the major ramifications of such a view (namely, that this would render divorce for marital neglect biblically legitimate today), it seems reasonable to require more explicit biblical warrant than the double argument from silence provided by Instone-Brewer.”

I think what these quotations show is that Instone-Brewer’s position as argued in his recent CT essay is only a popularization of the view he has argued for years in his scholarly work and that his position has already been addressed in scholarly treatments such as in God, Marriage & Family. Now to your questions.

Q: It seems you are distinguishing between abandonment and neglect. The former is a legitimate ground for divorce, the latter is not. What is the difference?

A: You are right, I am making this distinction, and you are also right that I believe the former is a legitimate ground for divorce while the latter is not. First of all, let me say that I used the term “abandonment” in my previous post only because this is the term Instone-Brewer used in his essay, and so I accommodated myself to his usage. The more conventional term in the literature, I believe, is that of “desertion by an unbeliever” or something similar. This scenario, of course, is dealt with by Paul in 1 Cor 7:15–16. Some, in fact, believe that Paul himself, upon coming to faith, was deserted by his wife, which is possible though hardly verifiable. What this “desertion by an unbeliever” (or “abandonment,” for short) involves is one marital partner’s coming to faith in Christ and the other spouse’s rejection of her partner’s Christian faith and their reneging on their marriage. In such cases, Paul says, the Christian spouse “is not bound” (1 Cor 7:15), which most interpret not only as establishing a legitimate grounds of divorce but also permission to remarry, in part on the strength of the parallel in 1 Cor 7:39, where a synonym is used in the Greek, “A woman is bound to her husband as long as he lives. But if her husband dies, she is free to marry anyone she wishes, but he must belong to the Lord.” In other words, verse 39 makes explicit (in the case of the death of a spouse) where is left implicit in verse 15: those left without a spouse (whether through the spouse’s death or desertion) are not only not “bound” (i.e. can divorce legitimately) but also free to remarry. As Instone-Brewer notes in his essay, this comports entirely with the standard Jewish formula for divorce, “You are free to marry anyone you wish.” So much for “abandonment” or, perhaps better and less ambiguous, “desertion by an unbelieving spouse.” Notice, then, that this scenario is very clearly defined and considerably more narrow than a broad “abandonment” category which may include abuse and neglect as it does in Instone-Brewer’s essay. Certainly, some cases of neglect and/or abuse may fall in the category of abandonment, but not necessarily in the sense in which Paul defines it in 1 Cor 7:15. As one of you said very well (so well that I simply reproduce your comments, rather than trying to improve on them), “I understand ‘abandonment’ to be referring to the case mentioned in 1 Cor 7, where one person comes to faith, but the spouse doesn’t and leaves them because of it. ‘Neglect’ would be more like a person not taking good enough care of the spouse (or not honoring, etc.). So abandonment would—they took off, am I stuck in this marriage or free to remarry? Neglect would be, we’re still married but I don’t get good enough [or any] love/food/sex/emotional support/whatever, can I divorce her and marry someone better?” (Incidentally, I also agree with your comment [slightly edited] that “in Instone-Brewer’s paper … he argues that Jesus only meant to slap down ‘any cause’ divorce, but then Instone-Brewer argues that divorce for a nebulous concept of neglect is legitimate—which is really close to ‘any cause’ divorce!)

Q: Would it not be better to understand the term “not bound” in 1 Cor 7:15 as referring to people’s right to live in peace rather than making this statement grounds for divorce and subsequent remarriage?

A: The entire chapter (1 Corinthians 7) deals with various instances of legitimate and illegitimate divorce. I believe the background is that some, for whatever reason, taught it was more spiritual to refrain from sex and/or marriage (incidentally, hardly a very common view today). If so, the implication was that single people shouldn’t marry and married people shouldn’t have sex or divorce their spouse altogether. Against this background Paul’s teaching makes perfect sense. He says, sure, being single is good, if anyone has that gift (see my interchange with Debbie Maken here, here, and here at this point), and even there, those who are unmarried but don’t have the gift should get married, because it is better to marry than to burn with passion (vv. 8–9). If you’re married, Paul says, don’t refrain from sex other than for a short time by mutual consent for the purpose of prayer (v. 5). Certainly don’t divorce your spouse, or if you do (disobeying Paul’s directive), certainly don’t remarry (vv. 10–11). To those who are married to an unbeliever, Paul says, continue in the marriage if the unbelieving spouse is willing to do so, but if not, you are “not bound” (vv. 12–16). In this context, it seems that Paul is not merely talking about living in peace but specifically about legitimate vs. illegitimate grounds for divorce and remarriage, a subject to which, as mentioned, he returns in verses 39–40.

Q: Exodus 21 says neglect is grounds of divorce for a slave, so certainly free women should have the same right.

A: The underlying problem is that Exodus 21 is not addressed in the NT by either Jesus or Paul, as far as I can see. So should we just assume it still applies because it is mentioned in the OT? That’s what Instone-Brewer does, largely on the strength of first-century Jewish rabbinical teachings. For most of us, this is not good enough; we need an explicit NT reference here. This, of course, entails important large theological questions regarding the relationship between the OT and the NT and hermeneutical issues bound up with this.

Q: What about cases of spousal abuse, then? What about cases where a husband beats his wife, or stops having sex with her, or fails to provide for her? What are the pastoral implications of these scenarios?

A: First of all, please see my comments in the introduction (i.e. the quotes from God, Marriage & Family) above. As a biblical scholar, my primary aim is to determine what Scripture actually teaches. I realize that there are many, many pastoral implications that must be dealt with no matter what one’s position is. I would ask us to remember that every case is different and must be dealt with on its own terms. I would also caution us against falling into the same kind of casuistry for which the Pharisees are known. We should not try to legislate what to do in every conceivable circumstance but apply known biblical principles to a given specific situation with which we are confronted. That said, certainly, cases of persistent spousal abuse may require at least temporary separation and a variety of means of seeking to stop the abuse and help restore the marriage if possible. Beyond this, I will leave dealing with this area and the numerous facets it raises to my esteemed colleagues in biblical counseling.

Q: If you allow for abandonment, why not see all the Exodus requirements as specifications of abandonment?

A: Please see my clarification on the distinction between abandonment and neglect above. I know what you mean, and I briefly toyed with the idea of subsuming neglect under abandonment, but in the end I believe that the scenario presented by Paul in 1 Corinthians 7 (per my discussion above) is considerably more narrow and specific than a broad “neglect” and “abuse” category. What he had in mind, I am convinced, was a case whether one partner became a Christian and the other rejected him and left the marriage because of his spouse’s Christian faith. This is very different from a vague generic notion of “abandonment” or a variety of other types of neglect or abuse.

Q/Comment: One of the strengths of Instone-Brewer’s article is that he addresses spousal abuse, which is the most pastorally sensitive issue.

A: I agree, and address it he does, but without adequate NT support, in my opinion, and with the effect, as Piper says, of “tragically widening the grounds of legitimate divorce.” Beyond this, see my response to the previous question.

Q: Aren’t the things contemplated in Exodus 21 tantamount to abandonment? If someone lacks adequate food and clothing, and gets no sex from her husband, I’d argue she’s been abandoned.

A: First of all, let’s remember that it’s not what you or I or anyone argues but what Scripture says. We must not substitute clever reasoning for the plain teaching of Scripture. It’s not a matter how skillful a debater we are in trying to make a point but a matter of seeking to discern God’s revelation with a prepared to obey it no matter what it is and whether or not it agrees what we would like Scripture to say. It seems to me that there are some who really want Scripture to say that divorce for neglect and/or abuse is legitimate and others who really want to believe that Scripture does not allow for divorce under any circumstances. (I’m not judging anyone’s motives here, some of you have said so yourself in your comments.) I think it’s very healthy and important to acknowledge that as one’s presupposition in coming to the text of Scripture, but then we must allow the Word to come back at us on its own terms, no matter how painful that may be. That said, I believe reasoned exegetical and theological argument can be helpful in working toward a proper understanding of Scripture’s teaching on a given subject, or I wouldn’t be writing this post right now (and longer treatments as well).

We know that neglected children should be taken from parents.

I’m not sure if this parallel holds, just as I don’t believe Scripture says wives are to obey their husbands exactly in the same way children ought to obey their parents.

So do you think that Exodus 21:10–11 is irrelevant, misinterpreted by Instone-Brewer, or superseded by Jesus? If the latter, is that supersession also an argument from silence, or does it build on the exception clauses?

A: That’s a very perceptive question (or series of questions). Please read my introductory comments (quotes from God, Marriage & Family) above, which indicate the reasons for my hesitation in this regard, in part because of Jesus’ silence on the subject in places such as Matthew 19. Am I therefore employing an argument from silence, too? It depends on how to define “argument from silence,” I suppose. The way I see it, an argument from silence is saying something applies even though it is not stated in Scripture while what I’m saying is something doesn’t apply because it isn’t stated. To me, that’s just common sense, or at least proper hermeneutical caution.

Q: How do you account for the lack of exception clause in Mark and Luke? Does that not lend support to the “betrothal view”?

A: Ultimately, I don’t know why the exception clause is not in Mark and Luke. Don’t listen to anyone who tells you he does (he’s lying). I believe we’re left here with reasonable inferences. In God, Marriage & Family, on p. 242, I quote Instone-Brewer at length, who notes that there are times when it is reasonable to infer from scriptural silence on an issue that people commonly agreed on this issue. If this is true in the present case, Mark and Luke may have felt they did not need to state an exception that was commonly agreed upon, namely, that adultery constituted a legitimate ground for divorce, and Matthew included this only as a side comment, as it were. Having said that, I believe that even having the exception clause—not once, but twice in Matthew—only in one Gospel requires us to obey what it says, and we should be careful not to try to explain it away or “harmonize” it with Mark and Luke just because these Gospels do not include it.

Q: In your view, would a repentant adulterer put his or her non-adulterous spouse under biblical obligation to receive him or her back? Or would the non-adulterous spouse still have “grounds” for divorce even if the adulterous spouse repented and sought (with God’s help) to take every step necessary to be restored in the marriage?

A: Like I said above, every case is different, so it’s difficult to address this scenario in general terms. Certainly, Jesus’ statement to Peter comes to mind that Christians must always be prepared to forgive. If the adulterous spouse is repentant and willing to continue in the marriage, the victim, as a Christian, should, with God’s help, try to forgive and be willing to continue in the marriage, but there are a lot of factors that may enter into a given situation that are hard to deal with in general terms.

To recap, then, in my view Instone-Brewer is too permissive, while Piper is too restrictive. It is not my desire to start any new schools, along the lines of the “school of Hillel” or the “school of Shammai,” the “school of Instone-Brewer” or the “school of Piper”! Hopefully our discussions help us all clarify our thinking on this important issue. I genuinely value this dialogue with many of you in the spirit of “as iron sharpens iron.”

Thank you for your patience, those of you who read thus far, and for your excellent comments and questions. Unfortunately, my time’s up and I must return to other pressing matters. Please feel free to respond to my comments above, but know that I may not be able to reciprocate any time soon!

The Book of Proverbs wisely counsels, “Like one who grabs a stray dog by the ears is someone who rushes into a quarrel not their own” (Prov 26:17). For this reason (if no other) I am reluctant to enter into the fray by offering some reflections of my own on the recent interchange between David Instone-Brewer and John Piper (or, more accurately put, on Instone-Brewer’s CT article and Piper’s response to it on his blog). Yet with some trepidation I will do so nonetheless, not in order to engage directly with one or the other of these individuals (both of whom I know personally and respect profoundly), but because this is a very important and serious topic addressed in Scripture that has many and real implications for all of us, in our own lives and in the lives of others around us entrusted to our spiritual care.

Starting with Instone-Brewer’s article (which summarizes several of his much larger works on the subject), for the sake of those unfamiliar with Instone-Brewer’s position, I will first offer a brief summary of his argument and then move immediately to a critique. Instone-Brewer looks at the first-century positions on divorce and remarriage held by the schools of Hillel and Shammai in order to understand the background for Jesus’ pronouncement in Matt 19:9 that divorce is not permitted “except for porneia.” He notes that both views were predicated on a certain interpretation of Deut 24:1. The Hillelites interpreted the phrase in this passage allowing divorce for “a thing of nakedness” or “a cause of immorality” to indicate that divorce was permitted for adultery (“nakedness,” “immorality”) as well as for any other “cause” or “thing.” This, then, is behind the Pharisees’ question in Matt 19:3: “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any and every reason?” In essence, they asked Jesus whether or not he agreed with Hillel’s interpretation of Deut 24:1. The school of Shammai, on the other hand, interpreted “a cause of immorality” as one single phrase referring to adultery, taking a much more restrictive position on the legitimacy of divorce. In reply to the Pharisees’ question, Jesus gave a resounding “no.” He did not agree that divorce was legitimate “for any and every reason,” as Hillel did. Those who divorced their wife for any reason other than porneia and remarried committed adultery. According to Instone-Brewer, Jesus thus did not reject the Old Testament itself at this point but merely a faulty interpretation of it, defending the proper understanding of Deut 24:1 as allowing divorce for adultery only.

As far as I’m concerned (though not Piper, see below), I say, so far so good. (I do not agree with Piper’s criticism of Instone-Brewer’s use of the Jewish background in this case. Using information on the first-century schools of Hillel and Shammai and their respective views on divorce is a staple of evangelical interpretation of Matthew 19, and rightly so, since the occasion was the Pharisees’ question in Matt 19:3, which clearly reflect their own first-century Jewish context.)

At this point, however, Instone-Brewer proceeds to make an argument from silence. He says that Jesus did not only defend adultery as a grounds of divorce per Deut 24:1, he also “didn’t reject the other ground for divorce in the Old Testament,” divorce for neglect, based on Exod 21:10–11. Instone-Brewer’s logic here eludes me. He seems to be saying that unless Jesus explicitly stated that divorce was not allowed in cases of neglect, we must assume he allowed for it (a classic argument from silence). This logic seems less than compelling to me, however, just as arguments from silence often tend to be rather precarious. How did Instone-Brewer get from an exception (however understood) that Jesus explicitly made to an exception he supposedly implied? (I realize Instone-Brewer says that Jesus did not have to make this explicit, since it was universally believed, but I would still like to see demonstration of a more direct connection with New Testament teaching here.) In terms of contextual exegesis, Jesus was simply addressing a question posed to him (Matt 19:3; see above); hence it seems that Exod 21:10–11 does not enter in to the discussion at Matt 19:9 at all as far as I can see. At this point, then, Instone-Brewer does seem to move from biblical exegesis to Jewish background, and does not have clear scriptural support (as Piper alleges more globally).

In his response to Instone-Brewer’s piece, then, John Piper states at the outset that in his view “the implication of this article is that every marriage I am aware of could already have legitimately ended in divorce.” (As will be seen below, I share this concern, though I do not agree that this requires the “betrothal view,” essentially a “no divorce under any circumstances” position, as Piper seems to imply.) Piper first turns to Instone-Brewer’s reasoning from Exod 21:10–11, correctly (in my view) identifying this as an argument from silence and questioning several other aspects of Instone-Brewer’s interpretation of this passage. Next, Piper turns to Instone-Brewer’s handling of the exception clause in Matt 19:9 in relation to Deut 24:1. Piper contends that Jesus disagreed with Deut 24:1 rather than merely clarifying the meaning of the passage (as Instone-Brewer contends), citing Mark 10:4–9. Instead, Jesus went all the way back to the beginning and reiterated God’s perfect plan for marriage as a lifelong union between one man and one woman. I agree with Piper that this is what Jesus does in Matthew 19, except for the one exception Jesus explicitly states in Matt 19:9 (a crucial point), which Piper leaves aside initially.

But this is the exact point that is debated. I certainly agree that Jesus upheld and reaffirmed God’s original intention for marriage as a permanent, lifelong union, but the crux interpretum here is what is meant by “except for porneia” in Matt 19:9. I contend that in this case (adultery/sexual immorality), Jesus allowed an exception. Piper agrees that there is an exception, but he defines porneia as referring exclusively to breaking an engagement, something for which he has in my view insufficient exegetical and lexical support (see Chapter in God, Marriage & Family). This is not the place to critique Piper’s version of the “betrothal view”; I have done so at length elsewhere, and maintain that what I have said in God, Marriage & Family is the most plausible understanding of the “exception clause” despite Piper’s response in What Jesus Demands from the World (remember that the “betrothal view” is held by a minority and that understanding porneia more broadly in Matt 19:9 has wide support among conservative evangelical commentators). As several individuals commenting at Justin Taylor’s blog have rightly pointed out, Piper’s reading of porneia in Matt 19:9 as exclusively referring to breaking an engagement does not constitute the most natural reading of the word in this passage but rather seems contrived, perhaps reflecting an effort to protect the notion of the indissolubility of marriage under all circumstances (though I am aware that Piper believes his reading is the best way to exegete the passage).

Thus I agree with Piper’s criticism of Instone-Brewer’s treatment of Exod 21:10–11 yet disagree with his criticism of Instone-Brewer’s handling of Matt 19:9 and Deut 24:1. Here, then, is the important point: Piper’s concern that Instone-Brewer “tragically widens the grounds of legitimate divorce” largely pertains to Instone-Brewer’s inclusion of spousal neglect as a legitimate grounds of divorce on the basis of Exod 21:10–11, which I also reject, while it does not equally apply to the understanding of the exception clause as allowing divorce in cases of adultery. The latter is an exception made in continuity with the Old Testament (where adultery was punishable by stoning), and Jesus does not mandate divorce in the case of adultery but merely allows for it. Moreover, adultery is the sole exception made by Jesus (plus abandonment by Paul, 1 Cor 7:15-16) and can be clearly delineated so that it does not amount to opening the floodgates to indiscriminate divorce as Piper fears.

To the contrary, I would ask us to consider whether elevating the scriptural ideal (with Jesus as the bridegroom “who will never divorce his wife and take another,” to quote Piper, citing Eph 5:25) without allowing divorce even in cases of spousal adultery may be going beyond Scripture and thus is pastorally doubtful. I continue to maintain, therefore, that affirming a high view of marriage as Jesus did while allowing exceptions for divorce in cases of adultery and abandonment remains the option that is exegetically most defensible and pastorally most sensible.

Last night, Ann Coulter said on a television program that Jews need to be “perfected,” with reference to the teaching of the Old and New Testament. Her talk show host promptly declared himself “offended,” and this morning Joe Scarborough, on his show, countered Coulter, saying to his “panel of experts” that “nowhere in the New Testament” did he find the teaching she was talking about. Instead, people would be judged on the basis of whether they fed the hungry, helped the sick, and visited those in prison. He also said we should not judge other people.

I know when I’m out of my league, and so for the most part try not to comment on politics (I’ll leave that to pundits such as Ann and Joe), but in this case, they ventured into the area of Christian theology and biblical exegesis, and on this territory I feel a little more comfortable contributing to the discussion. In short, I am going to argue that while I may have wished that Ann Coulter had expressed her view with greater theological sophistication, she did have a point, and Joe’s efforts to “clarify” the New Testament’s teaching fell, at least in my opinion, flat.

Rightly interpreted, does the New Testament teach that the Jews need to be “perfected,” to use Ann Coulter’s language? Do Jews need to believe in Jesus the Messiah in order for them to be saved? Or is this belief optional, just for Christians, and non-Christian Jews can go on holding to their own beliefs (which involves rejecting Jesus as Messiah)? (In case some of you reading the last sentence are wondering about the phrase “non-Christian Jews”—as if there were “Christian Jews”—there were, and are, in fact Christian or messianic Jews who believe in Jesus as Messiah.)

To address this issue, we must do better than Joe Scarborough, quoting one or two passages out of context. We need to look at all the relevant passages on the topic in Scripture, and try to understand the biblical theology on this subject. Since the genre of this post is that of a blog, not a scholarly monograph, this is not the place to do this; I will limit myself to a few key passages. On the one hand, Jesus did acknowledge that “salvation comes from the Jews” (John 4:22), that is, the Jews are God’s chosen people per the Hebrew Scriptures (the Old Testament), and it is through them that the Messiah, Jesus, came. Jesus was a Jew!

At the same time, Jesus unequivocally claimed to be the Messiah and the only way to God. In John 14:6, he is quoted as saying, “I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.” The same belief is echoed by the early Christians. Thus Luke quotes Peter as teaching, “Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no other name given under heaven by which we must be saved” (Acts 4:12). So who is this name? “… then know this, you and all the people of Israel: It is by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom you crucified but whom God raised from the dead … Jesus is ‘the stone you builders rejected, which has become the cornerstone’” (Acts 4:10–11, quoting Ps 118:22). The name without which no one—Jew or non-Jew—can be saved is Jesus. (And notice that Peter was addressing his fellow Jews.)

What will happen to Jews, then, who reject Jesus as Messiah? In John’s Gospel Chapter 8, in a passage many consider (erroneously, in my opinion) anti-Semitic, Jesus is quoted as saying that the Jews—his own people—are “children of the devil,” which, in context, means “sinners.” Imagine that—Jews are sinners, just like the rest of us! But if they are sinners, they need salvation. And how can they be saved? By feeding the hungry, helping the sick, and visiting those in prison, as Joe Scarborough is misrepresenting Jesus as teaching? No! According to both Jesus and the early church, salvation—not only for non-Jews but also for Jews—is “found in no one else” but Jesus.

So how do Jews get saved? Just like the rest of us—by believing that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God (John 20:31). There is no special arrangement, no exception, no partiality. As Paul wrote, “There is no difference between Jew and Gentile, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and all are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus.” That’s what the New Testament says. You didn’t hear it on Joe Scarborough’s morning show—but check it out, it’s right there in the Bible. Maybe Ann Coulter, in her amateurish way of expressing it, did have a point—this time?

Christians celebrate Christmas and Easter every year, but few know when Jesus was actually born and when he died. With Christmas less than 3 months away, some of you may find the following post helpful. Not that any great doctrine rests on the calculations below, but it sure is nice that we can have reasonable confidence that the dates of Jesus’ birth and death are secure and can be gleaned from a combination of biblical and extrabiblical historical data. I may not be willing to stake my life on the accuracy of the data below, but I am confident enough of these calculations that the license plate of my van reads as follows: 5BC–AD33. So here you go:

Jesus’ birth most likely took place in late November of 5 B.C. (the most authoritative treatment of which I am aware is Paul L. Maier, “The Date of the Nativity and the Chronology of Jesus’ Life,” in Chronos, karios, Christos: Nativity and Chronological Studies Presented to Jack Finegan [ed. J. Vardaman and E. M. Yamauchi; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1989], 113–30). This, incidentally, would allow enough time for Jesus to be born and for Herod (who died in 4 B.C.) to mount his campaign to have all the boys two years old and under in Bethlehem and vicinity killed (see Matt 2:16, 19).

Jesus’ crucifixion probably occurred on Friday, April 3, A.D. 33. Luke 3:1–3 tells us that John the Baptist, Jesus’ forerunner, began his ministry “in the 15^th year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar.” Both Roman historians Tacitus (Annales 4 §4) and Suetonius (Tiberius 73) date the beginning of Tiberius’s reign at A.D. 14 (the precise date is August 19, the day of Emperor Augustus’s death). Hence the 15^th year of Tiberius’s reign, counting from August 19, A.D. 14, brings us to A.D. 29 (14 + 15 = 29).

According to Luke 3:23, Jesus was “about 30 years old” when he began his ministry. If Jesus was born in 5 B.C. (as argued above) and began his ministry, as is indicated by all four Gospels, shortly after that of John the Baptist (that is, in the latter part of the year A.D. 29), this would mean that Jesus was about 33 years old when he began his public ministry (see H. W. Hoehner, Chronological Aspects of the Life of Christ [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1977], 31–37 and B. Messner, “’In the Fifteenth Year’ Reconsidered: A Study of Luke 3:1,” Stone-Campbell Journal 1 [1998]: 201–11).

John’s Gospel records Jesus’ appearance at at least 3 Passovers: (1) in Jerusalem (2:13, 23); (2) in Galilee (6:4); and (3) again in Jerusalem (11:55; 12:1). In addition, it is likely that he attended a fourth Passover not recorded in John but recorded in the Synoptics (Matt 12:1 pars.?). This adds up to a length of about 3 ½ years for Jesus’ ministry. If he began his ministry in late A.D. 29, this brings us to A.D. 33 for the crucifixion. It so happens that because of astronomical calculations A.D. 30 and 33 are the only possible dates for Jesus’ crucifixion as far as the date of Passover in these two years is concerned (for the dating of the four Passovers in question see esp. C. J. Humphreys and W. G. Waddington, “The Jewish Calendar, a Lunar Eclipse, and the Date of Christ’s Crucifixion,” Tyndale Bulletin 43 [1992]: 331–51, esp. 335).

Finally, John 2:20 says that the temple was completed 46 years ago (see for this translation A. J. Köstenberger, John [BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004], 109–10). According to Josephus, the renovation of the temple building proper started in 20/19 B.C. (Antiquities 15.11.1 §380), with completion 18 months later in 18/17 B.C. (Antiquities 15.11.6 §421). Again, counting from 18/17 B.C., adding 46 years brings us to A.D. 29 (there was no year zero)—a great way to check our math above!

For Further Study: See the chart in A. J. Köstenberger, John (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 11–13, and commentary at 1:19 and 2:20, and the previous post on Johannine chronology here. See also H. W. Hoehner, “Chronology,” in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels (ed. J. B. Green, S. McKnight, and I. H. Marshall; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992), 118–22.